I propose that scientific research be classified on the basis of the responses to the following question


I propose that scientific research be classified on the basis of the responses to the following question:
- is the research likely to contribute to making possible for all 7 billions of us human beings and members our future generations to each lead a fullfilling life over the long term on our planet?


If yes, then it's good and probably deserves to be funded.
If no (or not really, or maybe...), then it's probably either pointless research (which could be carried out only to the extent that it involves minimal cost to the collectivity) or it's bad research, which should not be supported by anyone.

This ethical approach is founded upon the following thoughts:
- research consists primarily of applying a standardized method for collecting data about the world out there and veryfying whether:
A. the previously agreed upon hypothesis (or metaphors) used by human beings to talk about (or "explain") the observed phenomenon is considered to be satisfying (the observed data "fits" with the original hypthesis)
B- whether the agreed upon hypothesis (or metaphor) needs to be reformulated or refined or made more complex because the
observed data does not exactly fit with the previously agreed upon metaphor.
C- or whether a whole new metaphor need to be formulated (usually by borrowing concepts from other fields of human inquiry and/or creating new words) in order to totally replace the older metaphor.

If indeed the above steps adequately describe what researchers do when they do research... then it appears that other metaphors used to describe what it is that researchers do are no longer be relevant.

Such metaphors apparently include the following formulations, that I propose be made redundant:
- researchers are "searching for the truth",
- "science is progress",
- research enables us to identify "what causes something to happen"

This language used on science reflect social norms shared by the speakers... to the extent that language can be considered as being primarily a mean that enables at least two individual to mutually agree upon a shared understanding of their experience of being alive. So the function of language is primarily social, in the sense that it enables individuals to relate with fellow individual human beings primarily by agreeing upon common words to describe experiences that are presumed by each individual to also be experienced by the other person (and, interestingly, language also allows for some exchanges to take place with members of other species).

Language is also taught as is from generation to generation. Doing so make it possible to convey to the new generation whatever collective agreement on the interpretation of experiences has been agreed upon by the previous generation.

Often however, possibly because we are fragile animals living on a largely unhospitable planet (we're plagued by disease, accidents, all sorts of catastrophes...) language also plays a role in maintaining in place unequitable social relations in between human beings. A simple way to do so it to assume that language is SOMETHING MORE than just a way to enable "individuals to relate with fellow individual human beings primarily by agreeing upon common words to describe experiences that are presumed by each individual to also be experienced by the other person". By definition, I cannot say whatever "something more" may be... I can however presume that "something more" is precisely not something that has anything to do with our experiences. "Something more" has taken many shapes and forms over time yet I'm inclined to belive that the primary purpose of this "something more" has been to enable some individuals to gain power over other individuals.
- i use the word "power" in the sense of increasing one's access to basic essential needs such as food, housing, sex...
- stating that there is "something more" that is beyond language, is a way to precisely subvert the function of language. From a tool that enables connectedness in between people (precisely because it enable two or more individuals to use common words to describe what they experience), language then become a tool for subjugation (of for gaining power over the other person). This happens simply because when we say there is "something more" to someone else, we also convey to the other person the paradoxical belief that there may be "something more", "out there" that just somehow cannot be experienced by the other person. From a tool that enables exchange about what we experience, language suddenly becomes a tool for asserting power. All of the sudden, language is not longer use to share about experiences, it is used to talk about stuff that by definition cannot be experienced by a person (the "something more"). Now, once the presumtion of the
existence of "something more" has been made possible by language, it also quite simply possible to make believe to fellow individuals all sort of inequitable arrangements... such as I get more food than you because "something more", or "god" said that this is the way it should be.
And such assertion by definition cannot be challenged, precisely because they position themselves as being beyong the reach of what one can experience as a living human being. This subversion of language is therefore a most convenient tool to maintain in place all sort of social inequality, precisely because they cannot be challenged. And overall, precisely because we live in unhospitable conditions, it's quite understandable why this subversion of language happened: some people were afraid for their life and subverting language turned out to be a good trick to get a better share of food, sex and shelter, usually to the detriment of people around you.

Now, the metaphor mecanism of language is simply a matter of assuming that when as human being we experience something new and we want to talk about it to other people, well, the only solution we have is to use the language we already have (in otherwords, language created to talk about experienced presumes to be shared) to talk about the new phenomenon. In a way, I do exactly the same thing when I say to my son that it rains because the clouds are crying. I know he knows the experience of crying. He knows clouds and he knows rain. Saying the "clouds" are crying therefore is simply borrowing a set of language used to talk about a know pexperience (I am crying, I seethe other boy is crying, my eyes are crying...) to talk about a new experience (the experience of rain can be talked about be like "the clouds are crying", from my son's prespective).

Scientific research, I believe, works with the same mecanism. Experiences (or data) are experienced (by the resercher). When interpreting data (in other words, when selecting the words to use to describe the date to other people, the researcher by default tries to use the language he or she already use to talk about this type of experience. When the data cannot be talked about with the usual language used to talk about such experiences... then language is either created to talk about it (hence the vastness and complexity of the language created by scientist to talk with one another about their experiences) and/or more casually, language developped to talk about other types of research is borrowed to talk about these new experiences. For instance, the founders of cognitive science in the late fifties found it very conveninent to borrow language that was then used by people from the emerging field of computer science to talk about "cognitive processes", presumed to be taking place in our mind. The language used to talk about the way
computers work was then expelicitely borrowed to try to talk about the way our thinking supposedly works (as described by Georges Miller in his March 2003 article "the cognitive revolution: a historical perspective", published in Trends in Cognitive Sciences).

The notion described above that science is an attempt at "finding the Truth" therefore probably is not an adequate way of describing what it is that reseachers do when they do research. It may simply be a matter of giving science undue social power, by proclaiming it as having anything to do with "something more", or in other words "the thuth". I would guess that this linguistic practice appreared historically when Science was replacing Religion, and the concept of "scientific truth" was replacing "god". Scientific practices in any case have played a major role in contributing to maintain unequitable social relations in between human beings... when scientist were for instance claiming that some people are "inferior" to others, or more mundanely when telling everyday that whatever they do just cannot be understood by the rest of humanity, because it supposedly is too complicated. By doing so, reserachers conveniently make themselves
unchallengeable... the same old trick to end up with more apples than your neighboors is just ongoing.

Which brings me back to the initial proposal for an ethical criteria to identify what scientific practices should be supported in priority. Those scientififc endeavors that explicitely contribute to render possible a durable, flourishing life in our unhospitable planet for all of us need to be embraced (and be prioritized for funding). On the other hand, scientific practices that cannot make clear its potential contributions to making possible a good life on earth for all of us and for future generations should either be denounced as strategies that subvert language to maintain inequities and exclusion (which is probably precisely what they do), or they may just be rather innocuous endeavors that just motivate the researcher for whatever reason. To the extent that they are harmless and not contributing to maintaining exclusion, he or she can go ahead with this research (as long as not silly amount of collective ressources are dedicated to such poetic efforts).